European aftermath continues to catch up, while Russia pre-empts Norman format
Ivo Mayev
The escalation of the conflict in Ukraine since the last few hours has gone through news channels as a usual news chronicle, without looking for the reasons for the surprisingly escalation of this crucial for Europe conflict in recent years.
The separatists’ hybrid forces, in the inevitable support of Russian officers, carried out a series of artillery firing, igniting the static ropes on the troubled front between the two countries in recent months. Victims in this situation are inevitable, but the cynical provocation on the part of the activist separatists was to seek a ceasefire after attempting to seize new, uncontrolled territories in the area of Novotoshkovskoye, Orekhovo, Krymskoye and Khutor Volny.
Why was this done after both the EU and Ukraine expected the deployment of the Norman Group peacekeeping process in the coming months? If we also abstract from the cynical idea of „celebrating“ the anniversary of the beginning of the conflict, we must push the roots of such behavior much deeper.
Obviously, this is a short-lived but pre-planned offensive from Russia that will not only disrupt the peace process but also demonstrate the consolidation of its positions. In essence, this active military demonstration is an illustration of the complete rejection of the 2015 Minsk Agreements. The forthcoming meeting in the Norman format and the preliminary diplomatic arrangements seems doomed against the background of preventive „warming up“ of the armed conflict and is evidence of the lack of any readiness from Moscow to participate in the pan-European talks.
But there is also another thing – torping the common ground for a summit should also seal the doomed ceasefire agreement of late 2019.
The persistence of instability and hot conflict in the periphery of Russia has always been seen as a source of the Kremlin’s desire to imitate efforts to achieve stability. In the absence of such conflicts, it is sought to artificially challenge them to apply a foreign policy tactic that compels the other party to agree to more concessions than it had previously negotiated with Moscow. In this case, no peace roadmap seems possible, since the short-term flare-up of the conflict must reject the Minsk Agreements. We can rest assured that Putin is able to maintain a cold peace in this conflict, and he does not do so, because he probably thinks that such behavior creates the feeling that Russia’s position is gradually weakening.
If we assume that Putin planned an active diplomatic role on his part at the planned Norman format meeting in the spring, then we should think that the current short-term intensification of the conflict is entirely a matter for the separatists and is not influenced by Moscow. But then it is indicative of another – the shifts in the Ukrainian presidential administration over the last week may have created in them the feeling that a vacuum had opened in Kiev, in which it was the separatists who were able to make a brief onslaught and give Russia a go-ahead to negotiate in the spring with increased territorial claims. In the moment, Ukrainian President Zelensky continues to spend credit on high confidence and has a stable parliamentary majority to implement a sustainable political project in the conflict. This is clearly not well received in the Kremlin, and it is likely that Russia will continue the tactic of periodic escalations to undermine not only peace talks but also confidence in power in Kiev. It will become increasingly difficult for the authorities there to defend the idea of peace talks if signals of complete rejection come from the separatist zones. And this provided that it was Zelensky who ordered the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, in accordance with Putin’s demands, precisely from those areas where Ukrainian soldiers are now dying or injured. Such discounts seem somewhat ridiculous against the backdrop of Russia’s refusal to adhere to previously reached agreements.
Undoubtedly, we must agree with the idea that the repulsion of the war from the Ukrainian borders does not suit Russia at all, and it will continue to impose it, not only there, but also as the number one topic within Ukrainian society. While the Crimea theme seems to be on the periphery of the Norman format, which focuses on the Donbass, Zelensky and European mediators will be catching up with the Russians. This means that the topic of sanctions should be updated and expanded with new measures and procedures instead of talking about their repeal.
We can also look for an additional explanation – on the day of the escalation of the conflict in Donbass, Putin fired his longtime aide Vladislav Surkov without further explanation. It was he who was directly involved in the conflict and the Russian position in it. Whether it resulted in the clashes of 18 February (as the Kremlin would probably justify) or despite it, we can only guess for now. Surkov was Russia’s chief representative in the peace talks between Kiev and the Donbass separatists, but a month ago it was officially announced that he would be replaced by veteran Dimitri Kozak. We have yet to see how this will affect the Russian position. According to those close to Surkov, he was a supporter of the hard line and did not enjoy minimal confidence on the Ukrainian side. However, nothing foretells that Kozak will change this course radically – he is, however, Putin’s direct proxy and does not have a political position of his own, but will fully comply with the Kremlin’s strategy. Surkov himself has for years been called the „gray cardinal of the Kremlin“, building the overall expansionist strategy in the post-Soviet space. And more – he was precisely responsible for forging the strange notion of „sovereign democracy“ and authored the Russian model model for opposing the so-called „color revolutions“ in the new states that inherited the old Soviet republics. Like the Kremlin’s long arm in these regions, Surkov has long established himself as the man who pulls the strings of the local pro-Russian political elite to keep him in the orbit of Moscow’s geostrategy.
A review in a broader geopolitical context leads to the idea that the bloody clashes of recent days in the Donbas are merely an illustration of Russia’s growing attempts to emphasize its key role in the Syrian conflict and in Libya. Moscow has already accepted that it must implement a differentiated strategy at all three points of conflict without considering its potential allies on any terrain. So far in Libya and Syria, the plans are somehow distorted – there are serious tensions with Turkey, whose development remains to be watched with interest. But the Ukrainian case is more specific – it clearly shows the distancing of the United States because of the grave conflict of the Ukrainians with the establishment of the Democratic Party. It seems that the United States will be more distant so far than Europeans and their commitments will be based on long-term agreements with Kiev. This is not necessarily bad news for Ukraine – it may seek a broader European coalition to support peace talks with Moscow. But it is not bad news for Russia, which at the moment has every prospect of winning with its hybrid strategy throughout the European space. It is certainly bad news for European leaders who seem quite divided in their position. The commitment of French President Macron to accept the invitation to participate in the great Russian holiday on the occasion of the end of the Second World War on May 9 is symbolic and marks a rather uneven European position in the Ukrainian case as well.
